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 Micro-foundations of producer power in Colombia and the Philippines: 
towards a political understanding of rents 
 
Charmaine G. Ramos 
Abstract 
This paper examines rent-creating state interventions in Colombia and the Philippines, where the 
authority to mobilise agricultural levies collected from leading agro-export sectors were delegated 
to producer associations. It investigates why coffee levies in Colombia are associated with 
production and welfare-enhancing outcomes, while coconut levies in the Philippines are depicted 
as non-developmental rent capture. The paper forwards an explanation based on a comparison 
of the basis in political economy of the power exercised by the leading sectoral organisations, 
FEDECAFE in Colombia and COCOFED in the Philippines. It finds that variations in historical political 
economy mean that conditions for collective action and the exercise of political power to influence 
rent mobilisation for developmental purposes were more robust for Colombian coffee than 
Philippine coconut producers. This paper explains the variations in terms of: (1) the economic 
basis of the power exercised by the producers; (2) the historical basis of productive expansion in 
the sectors; and (3) the political basis of the collection and mobilisation of the levies. 
 
Keywords: political economy, institutions, rent-seeking, agro-export commodity production, 
producer associations 
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1 Introduction 
Why would state interventions that create rents yield different developmental outcomes? This is 
an important question in developing economies, where corruption may be endemic but state-
created rents nevertheless a necessary means to provide incentives for production and 
investment. This paper examines this question through a comparative study of two cases of 
agricultural levies1 collected from Philippine coconut and Colombian coffee producers.  It 
examines how the power to mobilise these levies was delegated to leading sectoral organisations 
placing these in a historically-rooted understanding of the political economy of the institutions of 
these developing economies.   
The analysis in this paper extends the neo-classical economics conception of ‘rents’ and criticises 
the depoliticised view of state-created rents as uniformly detrimental to development. In neo-
classical economics, ‘rents’ are returns to an economic activity in excess of what would be received 
under perfect competition and ‘created’ by the state through interventions that regulate entry in 
said economic activity.2 But this paper extends this conception by recognising that rents are 
generated not just by restrictions to entry and trade but also by – as suggested by Khan (2000b, 
                                                          
1Levies are special use taxes enforced by the state. In the Philippines, the tax was levied on producers 
from the first sale of copra. The tax was collected for 10 years from 1971 to 1982. The levies collected 
were used to set up investment funds, held in trust by the government in the name of coconut producers. 
It was through the investment funds that coconut producers were nominally able to invest in shoring up 
the industrial capacity of the sector.  In Colombia, the tax was imposed on coffee exporters and evolved 
with changes in the primary functions of the tax and collected from 1927 to the present. The first tax, 
collected from 1927-1972, was a volume-based general tax on coffee exports. Until 1940, the primary 
function of the tax related to providing the incentives for membership into the FEDECAFE and to shore up 
investments into the sector. Additional taxes were collected from coffee producers after 1940, when the 
Fondo Nacional del Café (FNC, from here on the National Coffee Fund) was established, originally 
established to finance the operations of FEDECAFE to buy, sell and store coffee as the Colombia became a 
member of the Inter American Coffee Agreement, regulating the world supply of coffee. First, a retention 
quota, through which private exporters were mandated to contribute parchment coffee, delivered to a 
FEDECAFE warehouse. Second, the pasilla and ripio taxes (from here on, taxes on low-grade coffee), 
through which private exporters were mandated to sell a volume equivalent to 6 per cent of their 
consignment of green coffee, bought by FEDECAFE at a fixed rate. Third, an ad valorem tax, which began 
as a tax on coffee dollars (1935-1944), which was replaced by a ‘coffee differential’, whereby dollars 
earned from coffee exports are exchanged at a lower rate (1951-1957; 1962-1967). In 1967, this was 
replaced by an ad valorem tax on coffee exports. The rate was set at 26 per cent in 1967, but has waned 
since then. A portion of this tax went directly to the national treasury, but a greater portion went to the 
National Coffee Fund and departmental committees of the FEDECAFE. Finally, in 1991, all these taxes, 
except the retention tax, were folded into a single levy called the contribucion cafetera. 
2Neo-classical economics approach to rents and rents-seeking are elaborated on in Buchanan (2008), 
Posner (1975), Krueger (1974).  
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2010, 2013) – politically determined redistributive transfers like selective transfers of taxes, 
production subsidies or any legal or illegal transfer that converts public property into private 
entitlements These transfers represent extraordinary incomes for their privileged recipients, 
incomes that would not have existed without the intervention of the state. Such state 
interventions cause an incremental change in the distribution of incomes.3  
Meanwhile, the analysis in this paper also proceeds from propositions in literature cognizant of 
the important role that state-mediated rents may play in the process of economic development 
and growth.4 In particular, it is centrally anchored on Khan (2000a, 2000b, 2005a), who suggests 
that redistributive rents may be crucial in the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist societies 
in developing economies, where productive capitalist classes require financing. Khan does not 
deny that redistributive rents, when directed towards unproductive purposes, could lead to the 
worst of developmental outcomes. But as suggested by the works of Amsden (1989, 2001; 
Amsden & Hikino, 1994), where these state-engineered privileges were disciplined by state-
defined performance-based parameters, they could lead to the most ‘virtuous’ of developmental 
consequences. Moreover, Khan (2000a, 2000b) also shares with North et al (2007, 2009, 2013) 
the notion that in the early stages of development, privileged and politically ascribed access to 
rents may be crucial for establishing peace that, in the context of developing economies, is a 
necessary condition for the very possibility of production.5 This paper anchors itself in the 
literature that recognises the possibilities for state-created rents to play developmental functions, 
and sets as its central task lending to an understanding of the political conditions that make this 
possible.  
In the Philippines and Colombia, the state deployed a similarly designed institutional framework6 
for creating rents in its key wealth-generating agro-export sectors. Here, the state collected levies 
                                                          
3 In general, Khan (2013, p. 249-250) submits that any policy intervention that changes income flows 
creates rents. The rents could be ‘positive’ or ‘negative’: the latter, is received by those who as a result of 
a policy intervention receives a higher than the next best opportunity income; the latter, is an extraction 
from those who lose income (say, as a result of a tax imposition).  
4 This notion is explored in connection to the historical experience of successful late-developing countries 
in East Asia (Amsden, 1989, 2001; Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Wade, 1990), where specific types of rents 
were crucial in powering processes of industrial upgrading. It is also explored in literature pointing to 
actual development experiences of now industrialised countries, where transformation of the productive 
capacities was made possible by state interventions conferring privileged access to rents (Chang, 2002; 
Reinert, 2007). 
5 The core of their argument about how access to rents could act as an incentive for individuals or 
organisations to be peaceful and cooperate with a given political coalition could be found in North et al 
(2007). These arguments are fully fleshed out in North et al (2009), and applied to a series of case studies 
in North et al (2013). 
6 I use ‘institutional framework’ and ‘institutions’ interchangeably and proceed from North’s  (1995, p. 23) 
definition of institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” and 
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from coconut and coffee producers, respectively, and then delegated the authority to mobilise 
these to leading sectoral producer organisations: the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation 
(COCOFED) and the Colombian National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (FEDECAFE). 
FEDECAFE and COCOFED were thus legally enabled to control taxes that should have gone to the 
treasury for redistribution to the wider economy. The institutional framework that gave producer 
associations the right to mobilise these levies effectively gave private agents entitlements to 
extraordinary income streams, which they would not have had access to without the policy 
intervention. In this sense, it is a ‘rent-creating’ institutional framework.  
These similarly designed institutional frameworks are associated with different outcomes. In 
Colombia7, the levies were mobilised in investments and institutions that heightened the 
competitiveness of the coffee sector in the world market. Moreover, they also contributed to 
enhancing the welfare of Colombia coffee producers, by stabilising their income in the face of 
commodity price volatility and providing public goods like roads, health and education facilities in 
coffee-growing areas.  The resources to finance these emanated from the use of coffee levies to 
shore up market power in a parastatal ran by FEDECAFE. Beyond the sector, this framework also 
had wider developmental consequences. It also enhanced the capacity of the state to mobilise 
policies around the goals of coffee production. Meanwhile, in the Philippines8, the way rents were 
                                                          
“composed of formal rules…informal constraints…and the enforcement characteristics of both”. [emphasis 
mine]I append the term ‘framework’ to emphasize that my objects of analysis are not the incentives 
embedded in a system of taxation (i.e., producer/export taxation) but in the institutional arrangement 
designed to enforce the tax—particularly the deputisation of private actors in the appropriation of public 
functions. 
7 Elaborations on the outcomes associated with coffee levies in Colombia can be found in three strands of 
literature. First, the performance of FEDECAFE as a parastatal organisation central to coordinating policies 
enhancing the competitiveness of the Colombian coffee could be found in Bentley and Baker (2000), 
Givannucci (20020, and Bates (1997) and Thomas (1985). Second, further elaboration on the role played 
by FEDECAFE in incorporating smallholder interests in agricultural and pricing policy can be found in Bates 
(1997) and Bentley and Baker (2000). Third, the evolution of the functions that coffee levies played in 
economic development is surveyed by Bates (1997), Garcia and Llamas (1989). A rich historiography of the 
coffee sector in Colombia, that also speaks to the role played by coffee levies can be found Junguito and 
Pizano (1993, 1996, 1997), who wrote a three-volume history – covering the twentieth century – of 
Colombian coffee production, the policies and institutions governing the sector, and its terms of 
engagement in the world market for coffee. Before them, Palacios (1980) wrote an economic, social and 
political history of coffee covering 1875 to 1970. Koffman (1969) narrates the history of the federation. 
Bacca (2010) critically reviews specialised historiography of the coffee industry, covering a comprehensive 
view of the field form the 1950s to 2010. 
8 Three strands of literature from which the associated outcomes of coconut levies may be gleaned are the 
following. First, is a strand of predominantly descriptive accounts of how funds were used for the 
personalistc ends by a cabal of individuals close to ousted strongman Ferdinand Marcos – accounts that lie 
at the core of the literature depicting the extent of corruption perpetuated under the Marcos 
administration (1963-1986). This includes Aquino (1999), Manapat (1991), David (1977, 1992) and Parreno 
(2003).  Second, is literature that explores the political economy of the coconut levies, with reference to 
political national configurations under the Marcos administration. This includes Hawes (1987) and Boyce 
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mobilised enhanced neither coconut production nor the welfare of the producers. Instead, the 
mobilisation of rents is associated with supporting the personalistic goals of a cabal of individuals 
and an authoritarian president. Here the framework yielded the worst aspects of primitive 
accumulation without dynamic benefits accruing to the economy. In a nutshell, FEDECAFE was 
more successful than the COCOFED in influencing the mobilisation of the levies around the goals 
of production and producer welfare. As a result the same institutional framework that helped the 
Colombian state shore up its developmental capacity—including herding growth-enhancing 
investments, and improving social welfare of a significant part of its rural population— was, in the 
Philippines, co-opted by entrenched interests from outside of the sector to build up their personal 
wealth. 
If similarly articulated institutional frameworks for rent creation yielded different modes of rent 
mobilisation – one with more positive developmental consequences than the other – then the 
explanation behind the differential outcomes associated with the levies collected from Colombian 
coffee producers and Philippine coconut producers must be found beyond the realm of 
institutional design. This comparative case study of Colombia and the Philippines provides an 
occasion for interrogating and potentially constructing hypotheses on the ways in which the 
political underpinnings of rent-creating state interventions may shape their developmental 
impact. 
In the first section, I compare and contrast the basis of the economic and political power exercised 
by Philippine coconut and Colombian coffee producers, and explain how this could be linked to 
the emergence of a politically significant producer association in Colombia but not the Philippines. 
In the second section, I examine the historical roots of productive expansion in Philippine coconut 
and Colombian coffee sectors, and explain how these nurtured conditions for producer collective 
action that were more robust in Colombia than the Philippines. In the third section, I analyse the 
political origins of the levies, and explain the alignment of political interests and the goal of 
productive expansion in Colombia but not the Philippines. In the final section, I synthesize the 
variations in historical and micro-foundations of political economy that left FEDECAFE in a better 
place to shape the uses of the coffee levies in Colombia than COCOFED was, in the case of coconut 
levies in the Philippines. 
                                                          
(1993), who both validate much of the descriptive accounts but pushes the analysis  by depicting the 
institutional framework for coconut levies as a means by which Marcos weakened his opponents and 
strengthened his political machine. Third, economic assessments of the coconut levies are surveyed by 
Clarete and Roumasset (1983) and Intal and Power (1990), all of which uniformly depict the levies as 
depressing the incomes of coconut producers. 
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2 Contrasting the basis of economic power: resource mobilisation 
and land  
In this section, I unpack sector-specific differences that contextualise the prospects for the 
exercise of political power by the producer association each representing the Colombian coffee 
and Philippine coconut producers: the sectoral significance in the national economy of their 
respective sectors; and their perceived common characteristic as smallholding agricultural 
sectors.  
2.1 Relative importance in the national economy 
The significance of the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors in their respective 
national milieus stem from their role in providing foreign exchange earnings to finance wider 
processes of industrialisation, and providing agriculture-based employment and thereby helping 
enliven the rural base for these processes. Exploring the historical evolution of this role reveal the 
variances in the relative importance of the sectors in their respective economies. In general, the 
Philippine coconut sector never really achieved the singular dominance that the coffee sector 
enjoyed over a long period of time in Colombia. 
Table 1.1 features data comparing the share of the respective sectors in each of the country’s total 
export earnings during years for which comparable data is available from 1900 to 2000.  It could 
be deduced from this table that coffee in Colombia generally accounted for a bigger share of total 
export earnings and for a longer period of time. Data in the table reveals, in particular, that for a 
period of 85 years, from 1915 to 1985, coffee exports accounted for more than 50 per cent of 
total export revenues in all years except in 1940 and 1975.  In the first decade preceding the 
Second World War, coffee exports accounted for more than three quarters of Colombia’s export 
earnings. To be sure, we are only able to compare in this table Colombian and Philippine data from 
after the Second World War. We could conclude from the table that from 1950 to 2000, Philippine 
coconut exports only achieved what Colombian coffee – in terms of accounting for at least half of 
export earnings – in 1950. But Nyberg (1968), who wrote a PhD thesis on the Philippine coconut 
sector covering 1900-1965, provides an indication of trends in export shares in the period before 
the 1950s that is useful to extend the analysis beyond the data presented in Table 1.1. He 
calculated that total export earnings of the Philippine coconut sector from 1900 to 1965 was US$ 
4.6  bn , accounting for one-third of  the country’s total export earnings of US$ 13.6 bn (Nyberg, 
1968, p. 179).  He also asserts that prior to the Second World War, exports of coconut products 
accounted for about 25 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. These figures indicate 
that even in the first 50 years of the twentieth century, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
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Philippine coconut exports did not exhibit the same supremacy that Colombian coffee exports did 
in the national economy.  While both sectors were historically significant contributors of export 
earnings, the fortunes of Colombia’s national economy was more strongly linked with that of the 
coffee sector.  
2.2 Land, power and collective action 
Based on Olson’s (1971) thesis concerning the logic of collective action – particularly the idea that 
the larger a given group, the less the incentive for individuals to engage in group-oriented action 
because benefits from cooperation are watered down by the size of the group – incentives were 
stacked against the establishment of an effective and working producers associations in both the 
Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors, which are both constituted by a large number 
of smallholding producers.  The failure of collective action in the Philippine coconuts sector would 
be a confirmation of the theory; but the Colombian coffee case, an aberration. It is thus important 
to verify and unpack the evidence on smallholding agricultural structures in these sectors at 
analytically crucial junctures: in the first instance, in the years before the establishment of the 
producers associations, to capture the ‘initial conditions’ under which these associations 
emerged; and also during the years the levies were imposed and mobilised by these associations, 
to verify the base of their power while associations endeavoured to influence the mobilisation of 
the levies.  
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Table 1. Share of Philippine coconut and Colombian coffee export earnings in total (in 
per cent): selected years, 1900-2000 
Year Colombian coffee Philippine coconuts 
1905 40.9  
1910 31.0  
1915 57.9  
1920 51.2  
1925 78.4  
1930 54.4  
1935 55.5  
1940 44.1  
1945 74.0  
1950 77.8 52.1 
1955 81.7 37.0 
1960 69.3 33.1 
1965 62.5 35.6 
1970 62.9 20.2 
1975 44.8 20.4 
1980 55.9 14.6 
1985 45.2 10.0 
1990 19.9 6.1 
1995 17.6 5.7 
2000 4.6 1.5 
Source of Colombian data: for 1905-1995, GRECO (1999), and for 2000, DANE (2013); Source of Philippine data: author’s computation based on coconut export data 
from Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (1980) for 1950-1975, and United Coconut Associations of the Philippines (1987, 1997) for  1975-
2000, and Philippine export data from the International Monetary Fund (2013) 
 
In the Philippines, the extent to which the coconut sector was constituted by smallholding 
producers before the coconut levies were imposed can be analysed using data from the Philippine 
government’s Census of Agriculture.  The Census data on farm size in the period from after the 
end of the Second World War up until 1970, when the first of the coconut levies were collected 
and mobilised, seem to support the proposition that the sector was predominantly smallholder-
based.  As can be seen in Table 1.2, more than 90 per cent of farms were less than 10 hectares in 
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size, and accounted for more than 50 per cent of coconut hectarage. Between 1948 and 1960, 
there appears to have been a move towards a more equitable distribution of farm sizes, as the 
share of both farms less than 10-hectares in size increased, while that of farms 50-hectares or 
bigger in size diminished. There was a bit of a reversal in 1970, when the share of bigger farms in 
total hectarage and total number of farms increased; in the aftermath of forex decontrols, 
expansion of coconut hectarage seems to have occurred in farms that were already large to begin 
with (Boyce, 1993, p. 190).  Still, based on the census data presented in the table, and unlike most 
tree crops in tropical agriculture, coconut production in the Philippines was never dominated by 
large plantations – at least in the years before the imposition of the levies. 
Table 2.  Farms and coconut hectarage shares, by farm size, before the imposition of 
coconut levies (in per cent): 1948, 1960, 1970 
 
 1948  1960  1970 
Farm size Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage 
Under 5 has 75.7 31.9  72.1 34.3  72.7 35.0 
5 and under 10 has 15.1 20.7  18.5 27.4  17.5 22.8 
10 and under 50 has 8.7 31.8  9.2 30.1  9.4 31.9 
50 has and over 0.5 15.6  0.2 8.2  0.4 10.2 
Source: Census of Agriculture, 1948, 1960, 1970  
 
Based on the census data on coconut farm sizes presented above, one could conclude that if 
average land sizes of farms were a measure of the ‘base of power’ of coconut producers, then 
they had a weak base, and incentives were indeed stacked against collective action. But, there are 
important caveats to be made when reflecting on the political implications of smallholder 
production in the Philippine coconut sector. For one, census data on farm sizes are based on 
operational land holdings, rather than land ownership.  For example, several operational farms, 
in which land is cultivated by tenants, will each be counted in the census as separate farm holdings 
even if they are owned by just one landholder. That is to say, the data actually masks degrees of 
concentration in land ownership. (Boyce, 1993, p. 190; Putzel, 1992, pp. 27-29).  Farm size data 
thus has to be cross-referenced with land tenure data. In 1970, 74 per cent of the coconut farms 
in Philippines were owner-operated (Census of Agriculture, 1970 in Tiglao, 1983, p. 256), which 
buttresses the claim that coconuts are a smallholders’ crop. However, it must be noted that the 
coconut sector in the Philippines had a significantly higher rate of tenancy than in the Colombian 
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coffee sector in 1970: while 20 per cent of coconut farms in the Philippines were operated by a 
tenant (Census of Agriculture, 1970 in Tiglao, 1983, p. 256), in Colombia it was less than 1 per cent 
of the coffee farms that were under this tenurial arrangement in the same year (Censo Cafetero 
in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 69).  Putzel and Cunnington (1989, pp. 13, 15) observe that the 
landlords of these tenanted coconut farms in the Philippines were mostly absentee ones – 
including teachers, managers, military officers and professionals based in urban centres. These 
trends imply that a significant segment of those who had the potential to form the base for 
collective action were not as strongly rooted in the sector in the Philippines as they were in 
Colombia. 
In the case of the Colombian coffee sector, the relevant period for the analysis of initial conditions 
for collective action is the period before 1927. Unfortunately, agriculture census data in Colombia 
were not yet collected at this time. But coffee production in the early 20th century is typified in 
literature (Bates, 1997; Griffin, 1968) as being predominantly based on peasant smallholder 
economy. This is a trend that began in the late 19th century as cultivation expanded from the east 
of the Andes mountains, which was more estate-based and where production was centred in 
much of the 19th century, to the western and central portions of Colombia, mountainous areas 
where land was cheap and production was smallholder-based.  Soon after the first of the coffee 
levies were collected, in 1932, Junguito and Pizano (1991, 58) cite data from FAO to suggest that 
at least 86 per cent of coffee production was concentrated in farms less than 5 hectares in size. 
Table 3.  Farms and coffee hectarage shares, by farm size, (in per cent): 1955-56 and 
1970 
 1955-56 
 1970  
Farm size  Farms Hectarage  Farms Hectarage  
0-1 ha 36.3 7.1  33.5 4.7  
1-10 has 58.1 56.9  59.4 51.9  
10-50 has 5.4 28.1  6.6 33.9  
                Source: Junguito and Pizano (1991), p. 59 
 
But as in the Philippine coconut sector, important changes were occurring in the production of 
Colombian coffee the levies were being mobilised. For example, Table 1.3 gives an indication of 
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some of these changes from 1956 to 1970.9 It shows that the area coffee farms of the size 10 
hectares and more were accounting for a growing portion of the coffee hectarage between 1956 
and 1970, as those of farms of the size 10 hectares and smaller were accounting for less. Junguito 
and Pizano (1991, p. 73) confirm that while the expansion of coffee hectarage was centred in farms 
under 10 hectares in size in the period between 1932 and 1956, between 1956 and 1970, the same 
was centred in larger farms.  
However, as in the Philippines coconut sector, data used to illustrate the extent of smallholding in 
the Colombian coffee sector needs to be treated with care. In the Colombian case, the issue has 
to do with the importance of differentiating between the ‘coffee farm’ (cafetales) from the ‘coffee 
estate’ (finca). The ‘coffee farm’ relates to an operational landholding in which solely coffee is 
grown. The ‘coffee estate’ is an enterprise in which coffee production is an important but not 
necessarily sole source of income. Here other income sources, unlike in the absentee landlord 
farms in the Philippines, would be farm-based too (for example, the cultivation of other crops, or 
cattle stock). In Colombia, ‘coffee farms’ can actually be operating within large ‘coffee estates’, 
implying that Colombian coffee production is less of a monoculture than Philippine coconut 
production. Therefore in the Colombian case, it would be important to verify not just the average 
size and distribution of the ‘coffee farm’, but also those of ‘coffee estate’.  
Data surveyed by Junguito and Pizano (1991, pp. 50-56) differentiating these two categories reveal 
information that bear important comparative insights with the Philippines. They found that the 
average size of the ‘coffee estate’ has been decreasing: from 20.1 hectares in 1955-5610, to 14.8 
hectares in 1969-7011, and 11.8 hectares in 1980-81.12  Meanwhile, the average size of the ‘coffee 
farm’ has been increasing: 3.3 hectares in 1955-5613, to 3.5 hectares in 1969-7014, and 4.6 hectares 
in 1980-81.15  Based on these figures, while the average coffee farm size in Colombia was indeed 
within the range of smallholder production at less than 5 hectares in the period 1955 to 1981, it 
is still entirely possible that said production was undertaken within larger coffee estates.  It is 
notable that 56 per cent of the coffee estates in 1970 were less than 4 hectares in size; while 28 
                                                          
9 This is an important period in regard to the rent mobilisation because, this was a period when the 
resources over which the FEDECAFE increased due to new coffee types of levies collected and in which the 
uses of the levies were shifted to domestic price stabilisation. 
10 From Estudio CEPAL-FAO, 1956 in Junguito and Pizano 1991, p. 51 
11 From Censo Cafetero, 1970 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
12 From Censo Cafetero, 1980 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
13 From Estudio CEPAL-FAO, 1956 in Junguito and Pizano 1991, p. 51 
14 From Censo Cafetero, 1970 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
15 From Censo Cafetero, 1980 in Junguito and Pizano, 1991, p. 51 
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per cent were between 4 and 12. This means that, even in terms of ‘coffee estates’, data supports 
the proposition that coffee production was smallholder based.  
But from a comparative perspective, it is this distribution (i.e., distribution of coffee estate sizes 
in Colombia) that we need to compare with the distribution of coconut farm sizes in the 
Philippines, to gauge the comparative strength of the ‘land bases’ of the respective producers 
association. When this exercise is undertaken, as I did in Table 1.4, it could be inferred that in 
1970, while both the Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors could indeed be largely 
typified as smallholder-based, coffee producers in Colombia had comparatively larger 
landholdings than coconut producers.  
Table 4 Distribution of Philippine ‘coconut farms’ and Colombian ‘coffee estates’, by 
size: 1970 
Size % of coconut farms Size % of coffee estates 
0 to 5 hectares 72.7 0 to under 4 hectares 46.0 
5 to under 10 17.5 4 to under 12 27.8 
10 to under 50 9.4 12 to under 50  20.5 
50 and over 0.4 50 and over 5.7 
Source: Philippine data from Census of Agriculture (1970); Colombian data from Censo Cafetero (1970) 
 
From a comparative perspective – particularly in terms of indicators of access to land as the base 
of political strength – the ‘puzzle’ of the power exercised by the ‘numerous’ Colombian coffee 
producers through successful collective action and the relative weakness of the Philippine coconut 
producers becomes less of a conundrum. From the discussion above, coffee producers in 
Colombia had a comparatively stronger ‘land base’ – in terms of relatively larger landholdings of 
the coffee estates and significantly lower rates of tenancy.  
3 Historical roots of productive expansion 
Historical differences in the basis of productive expansion of these two sectors also provide clues 
about why a stronger producer association took root in Colombia but not the Philippines. In the 
Philippines, the American colonial legacy left two important imprints in the coconut sector: 
incentives for productive expansion based on a prolonged protected access to the US market, and 
the absence of a tradition fostering planters associations like those found in European colonies in 
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Southeast Asia.  In contrast, the expansion of coffee in Colombia in the twentieth century was 
mostly an indigenous process powered by the cultivation of frontier lands in the western part of 
the coffee zone, and financed by an emergent commercial class. While coconut producers were 
coddled by a protected US market and had neither the incentive nor tradition to come together 
to solve problems of production for much of the twentieth century, Colombian coffee openly 
competed in the international market for coffee from early in the century until 1940, when 
Colombia signed the Inter-American Coffee Agreement. 
3.1 Colonial imprints on productive expansion in the Philippines 
In general, the coconut industry in the Philippines – its place in the political economy and 
dominance in the world market – was mostly shaped by American colonial and neo-colonial 
policies. In particular, the Philippines’ protected access to the US markets for coconut oil and 
desiccated coconut, effected through policies circumscribing an ‘economy of special relations’ 
between the Philippines and the US, provided the incentives for Philippine agro-export production 
for close to three-quarters of the twentieth century.  
From 1909 to 1934, the Philippines and the US entered into a regime of free trade in all products 
traded, except Philippine tobacco and sugar, which were initially subjected to import quotas in 
the US.16 Under this trade regime, Philippine exports of coconut oil and desiccated coconut 
enjoyed special advantage in the US markets. From 1922, Philippine coconut oil producers were 
not subjected to a two cent per pound tariff duty that was levied on all other coconut oil imports 
into the US (Rice, 1935, p. 157).  Meanwhile, duty on desiccated coconut increased from two to 
three and one-half cents per pound in the same year—a trade tax from which the Philippines was 
also exempted (Hawes, 1987b, p. 61).  
The regime of ‘special relations’ was extended in 1946 as a result of the devastation wrought by 
the Second World War, which destroyed vital infrastructure in the country, including many of the 
coconut mills.  The regime was to last until soon after the imposition of the coconut levies in 1974. 
Through the Tydings Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the United States committed US$ 620 million for 
post-war reconstruction in the Philippines, subject to the condition the two countries entered an 
                                                          
16 This regime was first enacted through the US Tariff Act of 1909 and the Philippine Tariff Act of the same 
year, which designated a regime of reciprocal free trade except sugar and tobacco, subject to the 
following limitations: (1) restricted but generous quotas on duty free Philippine sugar and tobacco 
products entering the US; (2) a cap of 20 percent on non-Philippine or non-US content in the total value of 
Philippine manufactures entering the US duty free; and (3) the exemption of rice from duty-free status. 
(Jenkins, 1954, pp. 32-33) The US Tariff Act of 1913 removed the restrictions on duty-free sugar and 
tobacco (Jenkins, 1954, p. 33) and governed commercial relations between the US and the Philippines 
until 1934 (Hawes, 1987b, p. 25). 
Micro-foundations of producer power in Colombia and the Philippines: 
towards a political understanding of rents 
Ramos 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
agreement governing trade relations. The trade accord, in turn, was embodied in the US Bell Trade 
Act of 1946 and the Philippine Trade Act of the same year. This agreement extended the duty-free 
trade regime until July 1954 – later further extended by 15 months to December 195517 – after 
which most exports from Philippine goods were to be subjected to progressively increasing 
percentage of US duties until 1974, when preferential treatment for all Philippine exports in the 
US were to be totally terminated. But Philippine coconut oil, along with seven other 
commodities18, was given the privilege of duty-free quotas, subjected to a decreasing schedule 
until 1974, when they were completely eradicated. The initial quota for coconut oil was 200,000 
long tons, decreasing by 5 per cent every year from 1955 until the quota was totally eliminated in 
1974.  
Thus, for almost three-quarters of the twentieth century from 1909 to 1974, American colonial 
and neo-colonial policies provided pivotal incentives for the development of the industry and 
fostered the dominance of the Philippines in the world market for coconut exports in much of the 
twentieth century. The effects of the policies outlined above are illustrated in Table 1.4, which 
provides a long-run view of coconut exports from the Philippines. The table shows the dramatic 
increase in exports of copra and coconut oil occurring from the start of American occupation until 
the eve of the Second World War.  At the beginning of American occupation, the Philippines was 
exporting an average of 71,444 MT of copra and 723 MT of coconut oil in the period 1901-1910. 
The average quantity of copra exported rose to 272,814 MT in the period 1931-1940, representing 
a four-fold increase from the average at the start of the American occupation. The increase in 
coconut oil export production was even more dramatic: an average quantity of 158,402 MT 
exported in the period 1931 to 1940 or a 219-fold increase relative to the average in the first 10 
years of the occupation.   
The degree of dependence of Philippine coconut exports on the US markets is also indicative of 
the extent to which American colonial policies influenced production in the industry. Before 1909, 
the little that was exported of coconuts – mostly in copra form – went to Europe, where the oil 
was extracted and re-exported to the United States (American Council Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1934, p. 1). But by the 1930s, almost all of the coconut oil and more than two-thirds of 
the copra exported from the Philippines went to the United States. And at this point, the 
Philippines accounted for one-third of world exports of copra and its derivative oil (Rice, 1935, p. 
                                                          
17 This was enacted in July 1954 by virtue of RA No 1137 in the Philippines and Public Law 474 in the US. 
18 They were: sugar, cordage, rice, tobacco, cigars, coconut oil and buttons of pearl or shell. (Jenkins, 1954, 
p. 65) 
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157).  To extend the analysis, Table 1.5 depicts the share of Philippine coconut exports going to 
the US after the Second World War.  It shows that by the 1950s, more than three-quarters of 
Philippine coconut oil exports and almost all of its desiccated coconut exports were going to the 
US. In the 1960s, the shares of coconut oil and desiccated coconut exports going to the US still 
exceeded three-quarters of the total, but by then shares had begun to decline. By the time the 
free trade arrangement of the Philippines with the US had ended in the 1970s, the shares of 
coconut exports destined for the US market had gone down further. 
Table 5. Ten-year average Philippine exports and US share, by type of coconut product: 
1900-2000 
 Quantity exported (in thousand kilos)  US share in exports (in per cent) 
 Copra 
Coconut 
oil 
Desiccated 
coconut 
 
Copra 
Coconut 
oil 
Desiccated 
coconut 
1900-1910 71,444 723      
1911-1920 87,239 47,164      
1921-1930 178,962 124,466      
1931-1940 272,814 158,402      
1941-1950 no data no data no data     
1951-1960 782,765 77,812 49,321  41.66 86.47 97.14 
1961-1970 738,183 241,337 64,084  36.51 82.12 81.70 
1971-1980 548,664 669,055 81,118  3.30 61.96 48.69 
1981-1990 101,799 925,907 79,737  - 42.79 47.36 
1991-2000 23,778 964,855 78,295  - 44.44 46.15 
Source of basic data: for 1900-1940, Hawes (1987, p. 170), for  1950-1975, Philippine Council for Agriculture and Resources Research (1980), for 
1975-2000 UCAP (1987, 1997) for  1975-2000 
 
Meanwhile, Corpuz (1997) noted another important implication of having the US as coloniser 
shaping the operations of Philippine export agriculture and a feature that resonates sharply in the 
coconut sector. He observed that Americans did not leave a tradition typically found in European 
colonies in the region, where planters’ associations  were organised and maintained research and 
experimental stations for their respective crops, working closely with government stations. These 
associations supported study teams working on the feasibility of diversification and on the export 
potential of various crops. For example, activities of planters associations in Siam, Java and French 
Indochina led to advances in production technology in rice. As a result of these associations' early 
establishment and activities in these countries and the absence of the same in the Philippines, 
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science and technology support for agriculture in the Philippines was thirty to forty years behind 
the system in Java. In the period 1914-1929, rice yields in these regions averaged at 2,200 kilos 
per hectare while productivity in the Philippines was 1,225 kilos per hectare.  (Corpuz, 1997, p. 
253) 
In a nutshell, the absence of a colonial tradition of planters organising in the agriculture export 
sector in the Philippines coupled with the coconut sector's assured and protected access to the 
US market– with the latter, probably lessening the incentives for producers to come together to 
collectively respond to the challenge of enhancing productivity –shaped a shallow history of 
organising in the sector. 
3.2 Internal drivers of expansion in Colombian coffee 
Meanwhile, in Colombia, growth in coffee production in the twentieth century was driven by 
internal processes of expansion.  The terms with which the sector integrated with the 
international coffee market became an object of debate in national politics early in the twentieth 
century. The preferred strategy of Colombian coffee producers in this debate – conducted before 
the Grand Depression in 1930 led to a spiralling down of international coffee prices – was to 
openly compete with Brazil, the world leader in coffee production, rather than to collude with it 
to suppress international supply. This position was shaped by the conditions of production in the 
geographic centres of productive expansion. Elucidating on this requires explaining the historical 
features of coffee expansion in Colombia. 
Junguito and Pizano (1991, pp. 7-15) explain that there were two episodes of productive growth 
spurts in the coffee sector with their own distinct drivers. The first growth spurt happened late in 
the 19th century, in the period 1880 to 1898, when national production increased five-fold from 
about 100,000 60-kilo sacks of coffee to about 500,000 sacks. Productive expansion during this 
period was centred in the eastern parts of the coffee zone – primarily in the department of Norte 
Santander, but also minimally in Santander and Cundinamarca – which were largely characterised 
by large coffee estates. Junguito and Pizano explain that the concentration of coffee production 
in this region during the late 19th century is explained by its proximity to Venezuela, a key hub of 
trade at that time, and its well-connected transportation facilities. Civic conflict erupted from 1899 
to 1902 that disrupted this period of growth. 19 In the peaceful interlude that followed, a second 
                                                          
19A civil armed conflict between the radical factions of the Conservative and Liberal, partly precipitated by 
falling coffee prices in the international market. 
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period of growth happened from 1902 to 1930. In this period, the expansion of production 
became even more dramatic – with production almost doubling every ten years.  
It is this second period of growth that had important implications for the conditions for collective 
action and the accretion of political power by coffee producers.  In contrast to the growth spurt 
in the late 19th century, productive expansion in the coffee sector in the early 20th century 
happened not in large coffee estates east of the Andes mountains, but in the western and central 
parts of the coffee zone, during the peak of a process of settler colonization of frontier lands in 
the departments of Antioquia, Caldas and Tolima. Smallholder based production structures 
dominated this area, in contrast to the big coffee estates in the east. The agronomic conditions in 
this region were ideal for smallholder production with no economies of scale, and for combining 
coffee production with other subsistence crops. Here, coffee was grown in steep slopes, where 
land had few alternative uses and was thus cheap (Bates, 1997, p. 55).  Data in Table 1.6 exhibits 
how smallholder coffee farms were accounting for productive expansion in the early part of the 
20th century – with much more of the growth in production occurring in the eastern part of the 
coffee region, particularly the smaller farms there. 
Table 6. Coffee production (in tons), by size of coffee farms and geographic zone, 1923-
1932 
Size of coffee farm 
(in hectares) 
 Western zone  Eastern zone 
 1923 1932 % change  1923 1932 % change 
Less than 3  20,540 37,434 82.2  6,333 16,030 153.1 
3 – 12  26,572 44,074 65.9  8,865 24,151 178.1 
12 – 15  14,649 30,640 109.2  7,586 15,138 99.6 
Greater than 35  9,815 14.384 46.6  15,789 22,473 42.3 
Total  71,576 126,532 76.8  38,393 77,792 102.6 
Source: Machado, Absalon. (1994). El Café: De la aparceria al capitalism, p. 123.  Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores. 
 
Against these two episodes of productive expansion, coffee exports were also accounting for a 
growing share of Colombia’s exports.  In the first growth period, the share of coffee in Colombia’s 
total exports rose from 20 per cent in 1880-84 to 55 per cent in 1890-94, and 49 per cent in 1895-
99 (José Antonio Ocampo, 1984, pp. 100-101). In the second growth period, after the downturn 
in the face of the conflict at the end of the 19th century, coffee exports growth recovered from 
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1910 and grew steadily, if not as dramatically as the first period. The sector’s share in national 
exports stood at 39 per cent in 1905-09 rising steadily in the following periods:  to 48 per cent in 
1910-14, 51 per cent in 1915-19, and 69 per cent in 1920-24  (Beyer, 1947, pp. 359-363).  
Moreover, Colombia increased its share of the world market from less than 300,000 60 kilo-bags 
in the early 1890s to over 3 million bags in the early 1930s  (Bates, 1997, p. 51). 
As a testament to the growing importance of the coffee sector in the Colombian political economy, 
the debate on the country’s strategy for integration in the world market was a matter of high 
politics. Junguito and Pizano (1991, p. 6) depict the principal characters of this debate in the 1930s 
to be the Liberal president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo with familial links to the country’s principal 
coffee exporters, and Mariano Ospina Perez, then the president of the recently formed FEDECAFE 
and also coming from a family with economic interests in coffee growing.  Lopez-Pumarejo was a 
staunch supporter of quantitative restrictions to delimit the supply of coffee and championed 
entering into an agreement with then world-leading producer, Brazil. Ospina Perez, speaking on 
behalf of the coffee producers through the FEDECAFE, believed that expanding production and 
increasing its share in the world market best served the long-run interests of the coffee sector. 
Bates (1997, pp. 60-61, 69-74) suggests that the FEDECAFE was, in its early years, a proponent of 
competitive marketing policies, choosing to be a 'vigorous entrant' in the world market. While the 
government wanted to collude with the other leading coffee exporter, Brazil, to delimit world 
supplies of coffee, the FEDECAFE initially preferred to free-ride on Brazil's international marketing 
strategy. He says that FEDECAFE believed that Colombian coffee producers could thrive in open 
competition "owing to the small size of the coffee farms in Colombia, the diverse crops grown on 
each farm"  -- that is to say that they could withstand the competitive onslaught by consuming 
food products in their farms while tending to their coffee (Bates, 1997, p 73). Thus, the preferred 
position of the coffee producers of trading freely and competing openly in the world market at 
that crucial time of productive expansion in the early 20th century had to do with the small-holding 
eastern coffee zone being the hub of coffee growth. 
But competing in the world market meant that the sector had to continuously innovate and deal 
with production bottlenecks to survive. And part of how Colombian coffee producers achieved 
this was coming together in the FEDECAFE, allowing themselves to be taxed, and then mobilising 
the collections to deal with these bottlenecks. In contrast to the Philippine coconut producers, 
whose terms of engagement with the international market were defined by the US and did not 
provide incentives for collective action, the Colombian coffee producers chose a competitive 
strategy – borne out of the dominant structure of production – that forced them to come together. 
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4 Political origins of the levies 
In this final section, I compare and contrast the historical and political conditions that led to the 
establishment by the state of an institutional framework allowing producer associations to 
mobilise the levies.   
4.1 Coconut levies as a ‘strongman’s’ political project 
The governance of the Philippine coconut sector before the imposition of the coconut levies in 
1970 was marked by a history of largely ineffective state policies, and of failed attempts by the 
COCOFED to influence the same.20 When, the law authorising the collection of the Coconut 
Investment Fund levy was passed by the Philippine Congress under the administration of Marcos 
in 1971, Eleazar, et al. (1980, p. 78) argued that coconut industry “won its major battle for a 
development mechanism that is both industry-financed and industry-directed.” The COCOFED had 
been lobbying for the concept of the levy since 1968 and it was mostly their version of the bill that 
legislated into law in 1971 This levy was used as a template for a series of other levies collected 
from the sector. From 1971 to 1982, President Ferdinand Marcos utilised the expansive executive 
authority accorded to him under Martial Law21 to promulgate a spate of presidential decrees that 
led to the dramatic increase in the amounts levied, the expansion of the levies’ authorised uses, 
and the centralisation of control of levy collections by a delimited set of individuals, including 
representatives of the COCOFED.  The authorised uses, in turn, of the levies included the following: 
(1) raising capital investments to shore up industrial capacity in the coconut sector, make farmers 
direct participants in industrialisation, and rationalise the milling sector; stabilising coconut oil 
consumer prices; (2) subsidising premium duties paid by exporters; financing a coconut replanting 
programme; (3) financing the organisational operations and welfare projects of COCOFED; (4) 
financing research and administrative expenses of PCA; and (5) purchasing shares in a commercial 
bank to address the credit needs of coconut producers.   
Thus, within a span of ten years, Marcos penned ten decrees that legalised the collection of levies, 
which were remitted to funds that represented a substantial infusion of capital into the coconut 
sector, and that nominally allowed the coconut producers – through the COCOFED– to mobilise 
the funds. The collection and modes of mobilising coconut levies during the Marcos years 
represent a scale of direct state interventions that the industry had not seen for much of the 
twentieth century and did not see again after Marcos’ fall from power. Thus, the collection and 
                                                          
20 These are elaborated on in Nyberg (1968) and Eleazar, et al (1980). 
21 Marcos declared Martial Law in the Philippines from 1972-1983, using exaggerated threats posed by 
Communist and Muslim insurgencies as justification. He ruled by decree, abolishing Congress, closing 
down media establishments and arresting key opposition figures. 
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mobilisation of these levies may be seen as representing a true shift in the governance of the 
Philippine coconut sector in two senses. First, the levies constituted a scale of public resources 
that was never before made available for the sole use of the sector. Second, the policy deployed 
to mobilise these resource involved, on paper, the direct participation of the coconut producers. 
The next question to ask, then, is what accounted for this shift in nature and scale of state 
intervention in the sector? 
One explanation relates to the elite fissures wrought by the evolution of industrial policy after 
independence in the Philippines. As shown in an earlier section, American colonial policies 
nurtured wealth accumulation in the export of agricultural commodities—including sugar, 
coconut, abaca, indigo and tobacco products. This also had had the effect of making these sectors 
central to the evolving political economy as the economic base of the land-holding elite that 
dominated much of Philippine politics in its history as an independent republic. The political 
importance of these sectors emanated not only from the tremendous wealth that they generated 
for the agrarian elite, but also because of the sizeable electoral base they constituted, with these 
sectors employing a major share of the population up until the 1970s. Unlike Taiwan and South 
Korea, where land reform weakened the power of the land-holding class, in the Philippines this 
dominance was never completely broken.  
However, the social and economic bases of the elite diversified as the country began to 
experiment in import-substitution in the 1950s. The devastation wrought by the Second World 
War brought the national treasury to the brink of bankruptcy and signalled the origins of import 
substitution in the Philippines– beginning with the imposition of import and export controls.  
Hawes (1987b, p. 20) noted that the rise in production of manufactures behind the walls of 
protection afforded by import substituting industrialisation brought along with it the rise of 
political conflict about who would bear the burden of financing industrialisation, the acceptable 
levels of foreign control and the degree of protection for domestic entrepreneurs.  He suggested 
that this conflict underpinned a stalemate between pro-agriculture and export-led growth versus 
nationalist and populist import-substituting interests and explained why the Philippines 
transitioned to export-oriented industrialisation much later than its neighbours in the region. 
In a nutshell, the institutional framework for the collection of coconut levies was devised at the 
point where import-substituting elite interests were challenging the hegemony of outward-
looking agrarian interests. Hawes (1987) suggested that Marcos – by employing the policies he did 
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in the agro-export sector, including through the imposition and mobilisation of coconut levies – 
effectively broke down elite cohesion in favour of the exporting sectors.  
I propose a different take on why Marcos, utilising state power, elected to favour certain 
handpicked sections of the elite.  Coconut levies could be understood as a rent-allocating tool 
used by Marcos to consolidate his political base under Martial Law – doling out what North et al 
(2007) and Khan (2004a) would call ‘rents for political stability’. Against a political landscape 
dominated by a relatively small number of wealthy families, Marcos was a political ‘outsider’, who 
was not part of the traditional elite – although coming from a wealthy family in the Ilocos region 
of Northern Luzon.  His declaration of Martial Law could thus be seen as a political project for 
undermining the political structure of traditional families and cutting their networks of influence 
(Dohner & Intal, 1989, pp. 387-388) and centralising political power in the executive. Marcos 
achieved this by disbanding Congress, the hub of locally-rooted traditional families and 
suspending all local elections. Government also seized and closed all newspapers, radio and 
television stations to deprive opposition their voice. Private armies were disbanded and control 
of local police placed under the Philippine Army.  
The same logic of undermining traditional elites and establishing and consolidating a base of his 
own underpinned Marcos’ strategy in allocating rents in the agro-export sector. Here, he used 
state power to secure control of the coconut sector in the hands of ‘presidential cronies’ (Boyce, 
1993, p. 190). Coconut levies were the resources used to establish monopoly control of the 
processing and exporting of copra by agents among those chosen by Marcos to underpin his 
political base, along with other opportunities for wealth accumulation for agents benefitting from 
the rent settlement.  
In summary, the establishment of the institutional framework for coconut levies was governed by 
political calculations of an authoritarian leader. The COCOFED did not have the organisational 
power to influence those calculations in a major way. Because of this, the rent settlement 
redistributed income to presidential associates and just some leaders of the COCOFED, which with 
its shallow historical base, did not evolve organisational processes that would have held these 
leaders accountable to the ‘mass members’ of the federation, who bore the burden of the levies.  
4.2 Coffee levies and the private appropriation of public power 
If the rent settlement associated with coconut levies in the Philippines was governed by a logic 
external to the productive goals of the sector, in Colombia the rent settlement associated with 
the coffee levies was driven by the logic of enabling a key wealth-generating economic sector to 
survive the vagaries of an unstable international market.   
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In Colombia, two crisis points brought coffee producers together, in two separate attempts to 
form a federation – the first was a failure; the second, led to the birth of the highly successful 
FEDECAFE.  
The first attempt happened in 1920, when the New York price of Colombian coffee fell from 31 to 
18 cents per pound.  At this time, coffee producers looked to a broader organisation, the Sociedad 
de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC, but from here on the Colombian Agricultural Society) to 
represent their interests – and it was the Board of Directors of this organisation that convened 
the First Coffee Congress to address the troubled market conditions. Based on the account by 
Koffman (1969, pp. 73-78), this first national congress was attended by 41 delegates, with the 
largest contingent from Cundinamarca.  As has been previously explained, coffee production in 
this department was chiefly undertaken in large coffee estates; it is also where the national 
capital, Bogota is situated. The first congress can then be construed to have been driven by coffee 
growers with large estates in the eastern part of the coffee zone and commercial interests from 
the national capital. The chief concern raised in the congress was the ‘valorisation’ of coffee – 
which meant raising its price in the international market – and related to this, dealing with the 
primary productive bottlenecks of the sector: transportation facilities connecting the production 
centres to the market, and access to credit. The government was represented by a functionary 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, who is said to have articulated the need for coffee producers to 
finance an international campaign to promote Colombian coffee. This congress formed a 
‘delegatory board’ (Junta Delegatoria), a smaller committee composed of six chosen 
congressional delegates, to continue the work of the First Coffee Congress to deal with the issues 
identified above. However, nothing came out of this first attempt – Koffman says the body just 
“disappeared without a trace” (Koffman, 1969, p. 77). 
It was seven years later in 1927, after another episode of falling international prices – the New 
York price of Colombian coffee had recovered to 31 cents per pound sometime in 1926, but 
crashed to 22 cent in 1927 – that a second congress was called. This time the initiative for this 
conference came not from the large planters represented by the Agricultural Society based in the 
eastern departments, but from producers and exporters of Medellin and Manizales, the capitals 
of Antioquia and Caldas, respectively (Koffman, 1969, pp. 77-83). As noted in the previous section, 
these departments in the western side of the coffee zone were part of the region where the 
smallholder-driven productive expansion of the early 20th century happened. The departmental 
government of Antioquia was also involved – acting as joint sponsors with the Agricultural Society 
and financially supporting the departmental delegates.  
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The FEDECAFE that is known today was created by this Second National Congress. The Congress 
was constituted by 29 delegates, including representatives from 15 coffee-growing departments 
in the country, the Ministry of Industry, and the departmental Agricultural Societies of Antioquia, 
Caldas and Magdalena (Koffman , 1969, p. 79). 
Unlike the COCOFED in the Philippines, the FEDECAFE did not actively lobby for the levies. 
According to Koffman (1969, p. 82), it was a functionary from the Ministry of Industries, who 
actively developed and pushed the idea to collect export taxes from the sector for its own 
exclusive use. It was an idea that was initially resisted, but a debate that was ultimately won by 
the government.  
In the year the FEDECAFE was founded, Law 72 of 1927 was also enacted, which had provisions 
for the collection of a 10 centavo tax per every 60 kilogram-sack of coffee exported, and for the 
entrustment of the collections to the FEDECAFE, to be used in the activities related to the 
association’s goals specified above. The law also provided that these services that the FEDECAFE 
were to render, were to be enshrined in a contract signed between the government and the 
federation. Like the coconut levies in the Philippines, the coffee levies expanded; the effective 
rate of taxation, increased; and the authorised uses, expanded to include price stabilisation and 
allow for mobilisation as investments. But unlike the Philippines, the producer association in 
Colombia remained the central and only conduit in the mobilisation of these levies.  The 
institutional framework first established in 1927 in which the FEDECAFE was contracted for 
services promoting production and the commercialisation of Colombian coffee in exchange for 
which it received the levies was to endure.  
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that it was state action that created a strong coffee 
producers association in Colombia. For one, local politicians played a key role choosing the 
departmental delegates and financing their participation in the national congress.  But more 
importantly, the central government enacted a law that provided the FEDECAFE with the means 
to control and mobilise substantial financial resources, arguably the most important factor why it 
was the second attempt at forming the federation that ultimately succeeded. It was because of 
this access to the coffee levies in 1927 that the FEDECAFE was “born strong” (Schneider, 2004, p. 
133).  
What political conditions underpinned state action that shored up the power of the FEDECAFE in 
Colombia? If in the Philippines, a strongman trying to build his own political coalition was behind 
the rent settlement in the coconut sector, in Colombia, it was a coalition that established the 
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institutional framework. The nature of this coalition in Colombia is thus key to understanding the 
political conditions that underpinned state action in the coffee sector. 
The founding of the FEDECAFE was brought about by a coalition that involved coffee growers and 
businessmen in the smallholder-dominated department in Antioquia, members of the Colombian 
Agricultural Society and a socially conservative but economically liberal wing of the party in power 
when the FEDECAFE was founded, the Conservative Party. This could be deduced from the work 
of Saether (1999), who closely examined the published lists of the FEDECAFE’s founding members. 
He identified – contrary to Koffman’s account that there were 29 founding members –33 names 
in the published list of the federation’s founding members. 22 He examined the biographical data 
of 25 of these names and concluded that while all coffee departments were represented in the 
founding congress, this did not mean that the founding congress represented ‘national interests’. 
He provided empirical evidence for Koffman’s description of the founding congress being driven 
by coffee growers from the eastern part of the coffee zone: of the 25 founding delegates, 16 had 
strong links with the coffee industry in Antioquia, as owners of land in the said department or with 
business interests in the coffee industry as exporters or processors in Medellin, the capital of the 
department.23 He also found very strong connections of the founding delegates with a wing of the 
Conservative Party called the ‘historicos’, a faction of the party that favoured cooperation with 
moderate liberals to promote peace and economic development.24 In a nutshell, based on 
Saether’s (1999, pp. 147-153) examination of the lists, one could conclude that the majority of the 
                                                          
22 Saether examined founding members lists contained in the following: Revista Cafetera 1928, Revista 
Cafetera 1968, a photo of the founding members found also found in Revista Cafetera 1968, but including 
three names that are not in the list, and a Conference registry published in the Revista Cafetera and 
included in a Coffee Federation Report (Los Propositos de la Industria Cafetera Colombiana, 1987), listing 
participants of the final session of the founding congress. In summary, he found that majority of the 
names appeared in at least one list; 20 names, all four lists; and 4, in just one list. From an examination of 
these lists, he found there were 33 identified founding members of the Federation. (Saether, 1999, pp. 
146-147) 
23 For example, among the 16 were three, who were listed as representatives of the Colombian 
Agricultural Society, but also involved in the coffee industry, not as coffee growers, but as coffee 
processors based in Medellin; and five other departmental representatives had similar business interests 
in the capital city of Antioquia. 
24 This included Carlos Restrepo, who was a president of Colombia from 1910 to 1914, and Pedro Nel 
Ospina  (also uncle of Mariano and Rafael), who were both part of the said faction. Mariano Ospina Perez, 
who I mentioned earlier as having championed the strategy of competition in international coffee trade 
and became president of the FEDECAFE, was also a founding member and Conservative senator 
supportive of the ideas of ‘historicos’. His family owned coffee haciendas and businesses in Medellin that 
exported coffee and produced textiles. Other founding members with links to this family included 
Mariano’s brother Rafael, and the lawyer of Pedro Ospina, Santiago Razo. 
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founding members of the FEDECAFE had Antioquian links either as coffee growers or 
businessmen, and that many had links with a specific wing of the conservative party.   
The nature of the coalition underpinning the FEDECAFE in the crucial first years of the federation’s 
establishment, in turn, explains the power it consequently exercised. To understand this, one must 
refer to structure of political competition in Colombia, and the place of the coffee sector therein. 
As observed by Bates (1997, p. 81) in a setting where the structure of power was highly 
centralised, the coffee sector had inherent potential to exercise tremendous electoral muscle, as 
production – including not just the numerous coffee growers but also the banks and trading 
houses dependent on the coffee economy – was geographically dispersed.  What amplified the 
sector’s potential electoral power was the coffee sector’s strategic location in a two-party political 
system where "partisan cleavages tended to fall along a single, well-defined dimension, one 
captured in the names of the parties”. This strategic location, in turn, was due to the important 
place held in the sector by Antioquia-based economic and political agents, who stood as a pivot in 
a two-party political system and had the ability to broker coalitions between moderate factions 
within the Conservative and Liberal parties. Bates argues that the coffee sector could thereby 
make or unmake national governments, and concluded that its strategic place in political 
competition rendered it to be in the interest of politicians to serve the economic interests of 
coffee producers – particularly the smallholders of the eastern coffee zone (Bates, 1997, pp. 81-
86).  Extending Bate’s conclusion, it was the configuration of the political coalition behind the 
FEDECAFE that propelled it to its position as a fulcrum in national political competition. 
Another function of a moderate coalition backing the FEDECAFE could be deduced from a view 
forwarded by Schneider (2004) about the Colombian state’s motivations for shoring up the power 
of the federation.  His analysis proceeds not from the political significance of the coffee sector, 
but from its economic place. He observes that at the founding of FEDECAFE, international prices 
were falling at a time when the economy was becoming increasingly dependent on coffee. The 
costs for exclusive state action in collecting information, setting standards, and promoting 
Colombian coffee were high because state capacity was weak at this point.  Moreover, the 
executive branch in Colombia was concerned about subjecting coffee policy (including taxation) 
to intense partisan conflict of the major parties.  Therefore, empowering the FEDECAFE backed by 
the coalition I described enabled the Colombian state to insulate policy-making in such an 
important economic sector against partisan conflict. 
As in the Philippines, the institutional framework for coffee levies could also be interpreted as a 
means by which the state sought to establish political stability. The coalition that secured the rent 
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streams represented by the coffee levies in Colombia was essentially a coalition that championed 
production through smallholders in order to address the social problems that coffee-estate-based 
production systems wrought: including those arising from land concentration and the living 
conditions of landless hired labourers, upon which large coffee haciendas were based. Saether 
posits that among Antioqueno politicians and intellectuals, there was a belief that the large coffee 
estate-based system was the root cause of the unrest, and that it was essential to create 
independent smallholders. He proposes that the creation of an agrarian structure based on 
smallholding producers was of utmost important for the conservative government of the 1920s. 
He said that, for example, the minister of industry in the late 1920s believed that it was better for 
the landowners in central coffee zones to sell off their land to settlers and tenants and concentrate 
on the business of commercialising coffee (Saether, 1999, pp. 143-144).   
Examining the historical origins of the institutional framework for the collection of levies from the 
Colombian coffee and Philippine coconut sectors reveals an important variation in the political 
economy underpinning the respective institutional framework:  the extent of the alignment 
between the political motivations of the original purveyors of the rent-creating institutional 
framework and the productive uses of the rents arising. In the Philippines, the motivations of an 
authoritarian leader wishing to consolidate his political base and stabilise his regime was the 
political basis for the rent settlement in the coconut sector. While I have argued that the 
motivation for establishing political stability could not be discounted in Colombia, the stability that 
the rent settlement fostered in Colombia emanated from the productive uses of the coffee levies 
in the smallholding coffee sector. In the Philippines, Marcos did not need for the rents to be 
mobilised productively to achieve his political ends, he only needed his chosen political agents to 
have exclusive access to the rents.  But perhaps even more importantly, the analysis in this section 
hints at variations in broader structures of power that explain why producers associations can set 
the agenda for productive rent allocation in Colombia, but not in the Philippines. In Colombia, the 
coffee producers were central to the political coalition establishing the rent-creating institutional 
framework: because of their position as a fulcrum in national political contests, the politicians in 
the coalition needed to accommodate them and incorporate their interests in rent allocation 
strategies. In the Philippines, coconut producers were not as significant to Marcos’ political 
project. In other words, it is evident from examining the origins of the imposition of the levies that 
Colombian coffee producers possessed political autonomy and bargaining power that Philippine 
coconut producers did not. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I explored historical and political economy foundations of the power exercised by 
Philippine coconut and Colombia coffee producers. I explained the historical origins of the power 
exercised by COCOFED in the Philippines and FEDECAFE in Colombia, from a sectoral perspective. 
I provided evidence for four important sector-specific variations in the Colombian coffee and 
Philippine coconut sectors that help explain differences in the power and organisational 
robustness of the producers associations in these sectors. First, while both were important 
sources of foreign exchange earnings, Colombian coffee earnings accounted for a larger share of 
national export earnings for a longer time.  Thus, the political power consequently exercised by 
the FEDECAFE could be partly explained by the sector’s intimate links with Colombia’s broader 
national economic interests, including macroeconomic stability. Second, while production in these 
sectors both can be largely typified as smallholder-based, Colombian coffee producers had 
relatively larger landholdings and lower rates of tenancy. This meant that the land size and 
ownership, as indicators of the base of political power were more significant in Colombia. Third, 
the historical basis of productive expansion in the two sectors provided different conditions for 
collective action. The imprints of the American colonial legacy in the Philippine coconut sector 
were such that collective action was not necessary for the sector to compete internationally. In 
the Colombian coffee sector, the terms of engagement with the international market in the early 
20th century were vigorous and competitive, and formed an important background in the 
formation of the FEDECAFE, and as such in securing collective action among coffee producers.  
Finally, the variations in the political origins of the rent settlement in the two sectors meant that 
the one that obtained in the Philippines was governed mainly by the political calculations of a 
strongman president, while in Colombia there was a political coalition that wanted to see the 
coffee sector prosper through the organisation of production around smallholders. 
The findings of this paper exhibit the importance of grounding the analysis of institutional 
performance and rents in an understanding of conditions in political economy. Developmental 
consequences of rents created by the state cannot be mapped to institutional design alone but 
are best understood through the lens of politics and history. 
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